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† In preparing this paper I am grateful to: Adam Morton and Vance Schamehorn, for their willingness to provide me with 
the benefit of their knowledge and experience throughout many drafts; Wes Cooper, for pointing out in the first place 
that my faith in the value of simulations was overly naïve; and Sarah Dawrant, for suffering through my philosophical 
tirades and editing them out of my drafts.
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we can justify any claim that simulations lead us to (partial) truths whenever they are used.
In addition  to simulations,  other seemingly uncontroversial  pieces  of  science seem open  to 
question   because   on   investigation   their   natures   are   not   as   innocuous   as   they  might   be   on   first 
inspection: models parallel simulations in their abstraction and simplifications and theories are known 
to work only for specific idealizations that do not admit of the complexities and exceptions of real 












In  what   follows,  I   provide   an   account   of   simulations   that   allows   for   a   legitimacy  within 
scientific practice that is on par with models by linking simulations to a set of, what I call, underlying 
models.    With  the hope of being clear  and succinct   I  begin my argument by extracting a  general 
conception of what a model is by examining three general perspectives on what models are.  Following 
this,   a   set  of   criteria   by  which  we  can  determine  what   candidates  will   actually  qualify   as  being 
1 A search through the Philosopher's Index for “model” and “simulation” returns the following results.  “Model” and 
“simulation”, 47 hits.  “Model”, 10613 hits.  “Simulation”, 385 hits.
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simulations for the core arguments in this paper is given.  With these tools in hand I then consider, and 
reject,   the possibility   that  simulations  are  models,  despite   the ability  of  such a   reduction  to  grant 
simulation the required legitimacy outright.    The reasons for  this rejection are  three­fold.    First,  a 
simple thought experiment shows that while simulations may require what I refer to as underlying 
models to take place, these models exist independently of the simulation they underlie and so the two 




special  kind  of  model.    With   the   relationship  between  models   and  simulations  clarified,   the  core 
property of simulations identified, and the role of simulations within scientific practice roughed out, all 
via the rejection of the possibility that simulation are models, the discussion is quickly turned to the 










2 For a particularly poignant example of a contemporary debate that turns on the interpretation of 'model' see the exchange 













a) Models as abstract entities.    From this perspective models are principally relational entities 
given existence insofar as they are contained in someone's thoughts and ideas.  These relations 






























conception   that   those   unfamiliar   with   philosophy   of   science,   logic,   and   higher   order 
mathematics will attach to  'model.'    Each of these models  can be seen, touched, or directly 
manipulated, in virtue of the common reality that they exist in, in ways that abstract models 




for further  investigation.   An example of  the explanatory power of physical models can be 
easily had by considering how an orrery or film can quickly convey the movements of  the 
planets around the sun in a way that a lecture alone could never achieve.3   There is something 
immediately   accessible   in   the   physical   representation   of   a   system   normally   beyond   our 
observational  capacities  that  makes any attempt  to explain  the concept  of planetary motion 













earlier  works,   notably  Cartwright   (1983),  Nagel   (1961),   and  Hesse   (1966).    Morgan   and 
Morrison point out that their view of models within science is not yet a theory of models that 
would help differentiate between model and theory, but rather a platform of information about 

































































taking  our  broad  understanding of  models  as   representational   relations  with  us,   turn  our  attention 
towards determining what the exemplars of simulation upon which our investigation of the relationship 
between simulations and models should be based.









of   these  paradigm examples,   for   two   reasons.     First,   the   frequency  with  which  “simulation”   and 























representations  of  what  would  actually  happen  in  a   real  plane.    This  case   is  problematic   for   two 











A closed simulation  is  one  that   is  entirely   self­contained once  the  initial   inputs  have  been 
provided, it contains all the necessary information to process the initial inputs or the data that it created 
as a result  of  processing this  input.    In contrast,  an open simulation accepts new input on various 
occasions throughout running its  program because it   is meant only to be a component of a  larger 





before  we  move  on:   it  must   be  understood   that   by   “simulation”  we   are   concerned  with  what   is 
conventionally referred to as the running of a simulation and not the construction of whatever elements 
are required in order for the simulation to be run.  I raise this distinction so that Winsberg's argument 










4. Simulations are not Models








showing that simulations are not models  in general  and part  two showing that simulations are not 
12/33














































































characterization  of  dynamic  models  be  a  model   that   represents  one,  or  more,  processes,   i.e.   they 







































presented  to  us,  but   these are  outside  the  flip­book  itself.    The  flip­book  is  unable  to  answer  the 







that  includes internal  state­to­state determination processes.    Further,   it  seems  unlikely  that such a 
demarcation could ever be made because once internal state­to­state determination has been granted to 
dynamic models they will share both the outputs and the production mechanisms of any comparable 













Since  we are  allowing   that   simulations  and  those   things  captured  by   the  phrase  “dynamic 
models with internal state­to­state determination” amount to the same thing, I will take it for granted 
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these  in­head models as more  than mere descriptors  of past  performances,  putting  them to use as 
predictors as well.   Through the process of predictive successes and failures, roughly amounting to a 
stream of small experiments, we further refine our conceptual models and our theories.5   Despite the 




5 We may well have a genetic disposition to see the world in certain ways.  The process that I have suggested here is 




will   likely  make  reference   to   their  cost  effectiveness  and  ability   to  overcome  impracticalities  and 
ethical  boundaries.    These are  reasons for  choosing simulations  over alternatives,   though,  and not 












cells   are   the   same   colour   (Staff,   2005)—through   generating   and   dismissing   thousands   of 
possibilities.   Such proofs are still controversial though because they run counter to unspoken 
components of the standard conception of what counts as a proof.  Proofs by simulation can be 
almost  impossible  to check by hand, possibly requiring even more time than it  would take 
someone to actually complete the proof themselves, and that any would be proof­tester/referee 
have the requisite level of skill in the programming language used, and computer science and 
6 The separation of the roles made here is for clarity and should not be taken to imply that they can easily be disentangled 





























the   entailments   of   the   underlying  model   given   any   set   of   states   (possible   or   impossible, 
probable or improbable).   It is in this role that simulations act as artificial worlds sufficiently 
similar to our own such that we can draw useful inferences and parallels to our own that is 
















7 Tit-for-tat was only victorious in the first two tournaments that Axelrod ran.  In a third, anniversary, tournament the 
victor was a set of programs that “conspired” to elevate one of their members to victory.
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confirms...,” and “Based on what we now know we have revised our position...” without having to 








simulations   fill   the   same   roles   as   experiments,   they   do   so   through   importantly   different   ways. 
Traditional experiments are performed in  the world,  meaning that,  as much as possible,  the actual 
entities in question are submitted to investigative processes, and it is the actual entities in question that 
provide   the   responses.     In   contrast,   we   have   seen   that   simulations   can   be   used   to   carry   out 
investigations  into  the nature of  the same entities,  but  via  representations of   the entities  and  their 
surrounding environment—a set of representations that is synonymous with our understandings of the 
world and how it works.   It   is on this difference that we may say that traditional experiments are 
experiments in the world and simulations are experiments in our understandings.





















the  name  that   is   commonly  used   to   refer   to   an  object   as   the  one  associated  with   the  commonly 




















between states.       This distinction does not rest in process, but in the character that simulations gain 
from  having   a   connection   to   an  underlying  models.    This   connection   is   observer   dependent   and 
therefore simultaneously (slightly) arbitrary and ethereal, but this does not detract from its importance. 
Recognizing that things act as models and simulations because of how we see and use them and not 























By  making   the   distinction   between   the   specific   and   ideal   models   that  might   underlie   a 
simulation   and   the   distinction   between   an   instance   of   a   simulation   and   a   complete   simulation 
determining what model underlies a given situation is made easier because it can be broken into four 
separate questions, not all of which may necessarily need to be answered, namely:
8 We might further refine this notion by referring to bounded complete simulations—those complete simulations where a 
significant portion of the input data has upper and lower limits—and unbounded complete simulations—those complete 
simulations where a significant portion of the input data does not have upper or lower limits.  Exactly what constitutes a 
“significant portion” is left to the community to determine as a matter of convention, but as a guide I suggest that 
bounding random inputs not be grounds for calling a complete simulation bounded.
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“Model” refers to:
Specific model Ideal model
“Simulation” refers to:
Instance(s) of a simulation
What specific model 
underlies these instances 
of simulation?
What ideal model could 
underlie these instances of 
simulation?
Complete simulation
What specific model 
underlies this complete 
simulation?
What ideal model could 














complexities  within   the  model   beyond   our   capacities.     In   this  way,   simulations   can   be   used   as 
microscopes or growth chambers by which we can examine our models in more detail.   This is only 
one  component  of   the constant   feedback  loop between models,   simulations,  and  observations   that 


























9 Straightforward does not necessarily mean short or possible.  Some complete simulations may have infinite data sets 
making an output by output comparison intractable.  Worse, determining whether two computers behave the same for all 








So far,  the discussion of what constitutes a simulation has been primarily abstract.    Where 


















using   “simulation”   to   describe   the   flight   simulator   because   from  the  perspective  of   the  pilot   the 
experience  is a simulated one because a plane is not actually being flown.   It could be objected here 
that allowing the status of a process like a simulation to be determined depending on the perspective 





More important  than using our  newly  forged conception of a simulation to determine what 
components of partial simulations are actually simulations and what are questionable is to recognize 
that on this conception a great deal of what is commonly considered to qualify as “thinking” counts as 
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